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Summary
A model of group formation is presented where the number of groups is fixed and a
person can only join a group if the group’s members approve the person’s joining.
Agents have either local status preferences (each agent wants to be the highest status
agent in his group) or global status preferences (each agent wants to join the highest
status group that she can join). For both preference types, conditions are provided which
guarantee the existence of a segregated stable partition where similar people are
grouped together and conditions are provided which guarantee the existence of an
integrated stable partition where dissimilar people are grouped together. Additionally, in
a dynamic framework we show that if a new empty group is added to a segregated
stable partition, then integration may occur.
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1. Introduction
There are many situations where people join groups, the number of groups is fixed, and
where a person can only join a group if this group approves the person’s joining. Examples include
students choosing a university, nurses joining a hospital, managers joining a firm, academics joining
a department, athletes joining a team and college students joining a fraternity. We examine such
situations where agents are concerned with either local status (each agent wants to be the highest
status agent in his group) or global status (each agent wants to join the highest status group possible).
Specifically, each person is endowed with a quality level and receives a (hedonic) payoff
from the group he joins which depends only on who is in the group (or only on the quality levels of
the people in the group). We consider two such possible payoff functions. The first is the average
quality (or global status) payoff function where an agent’s payoff is increasing in the average quality
of the agents in his group. Such a person is concerned with global status since he wants to be a
member of the most prestigious group (or the group with the highest average quality).1 The second
payoff function considered is the big fish (or local status) payoff function. Here an agent prefers the
group where he is the highest quality agent (or the “big fish”) in the group. Such an agent is
concerned with local status, since he cares about his quality ranking within his group. For example,
a local status person prefers a position at a less prestigious firm if he is the “big fish” there.2
When people choose with whom to associate they often end up in segregated partitions where
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Since an agent changes the average quality of a group once he joins it, we assume an
agent includes himself when calculating average quality. As a consequence, a low quality agent
may have a bias towards joining a larger group since his quality does not decrease the average as
much, while a high quality agent may have a bias towards joining a smaller group.
2

A discussion of global versus local status and how a person may trade one for the other
is given in Frank [1985]; an axiomatization of local status is given in Ök and Kockesen [2000].
1

agents of similar characteristics (or qualities) are grouped together.3 We are interested in whether
or not our preferences are also biased towards like agents seeking out like agents. Intuitively, both
local and global status preferences seem somewhat biased towards segregation and in fact we find
that under both types of preferences a segregated stable partition always exists.4 However, in spite
of this apparent bias, under big fish preferences an integrated stable partition almost always exists
where people with dissimilar quality levels are grouped together and under average quality
preferences an integrated stable partition exists if certain conditions are met.
We also investigate in a dynamic group formation model what happens to a segregated stable
partition when a new empty group (or location) is added and show that the addition of such an empty
location may cause integration to occur. As far as we know this is the first paper in the hedonic group
formation literature to examine what happens to stable partitions when a new location is added.
We define a partition to be stable if whenever there exists an agent who wants to change
locations, the non-strict majority of agents at the new location vetoes the move. This stability notion
is related to both the concept of “individual stability” (see Greenberg [1978], Drèze and Greenberg
[1980], and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002]) and to the concept of “Nash stability” (see Brams,
Jones and Kilgour [2002], Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002], and Milchtaich and Winter [2002]).
Under individual stability an agent needs unanimous approval by agents at the new location in order
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For instance consider the local public good literature of Tiebout [1956], Wooders [1980]
and Greenberg and Weber [1986] where agents prefer those with preferences regarding local
public good production given taxation most similar to themselves and often end up in segregated
partitions. Alternatively, Milchtaich and Winter [2002] examine group formation where agents
prefer to be with others similar to themselves and provide conditions under which stable
partitions are segregating and Pareto efficient.
4

To see this bias note that if preferences are average quality (respectively, big fish) and if
agents are in an integrated partition, then often high (respectively, mid or low) quality agents
both want to and can leave an integrated group.
2

to move, while under Nash stability an agent can move without anyone’s approval. Nash stability
is more demanding than individual stability, while our definition of stability is in between.5
The paper most closely related to the current one is Milchtaich and Winter [2002] who also
study group formation when the number of groups is fixed. Their model differs from ours in that
agents want to join the group which has agents who are the most similar to them and agents do not
need permission from the new group in order to join it. Milchtaich and Winter [2002] show that
segregated, stable partitions exist and that a dynamic model of group formation always converges
to a stable, segregated partition. Additionally, in their model integrated stable partitions are not
weakly Pareto efficient, while in our model an integrated stable partition can be Pareto efficient.6
The literature on coalition formation in hedonic games (where an agent’s payoff is based
solely on who else is in his coalition) is also closely related to our paper; see founding paper Drèze
and Greenberg [1980], as well as Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez [2001], Cechlárová and RomeroMedina [2001], Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002], Burani and Zwicker [2003], Diamontoudi and
Xue [2003], Ballester [2004], Dimitrov et.al. [2004], Dimitrov and Sung [2004], and Pápai [2004].
Most of these papers focus on restrictions on preferences which lead to stable coalition partitions.7

5

Nash stability here often results in no stable partitions since with average quality payoffs
a high quality agent at a low quality group wishes to move to a higher quality group, while with
big fish payoffs any high quality agent not ranked first wants to move to a lower quality location.
Individual stability applied to big fish payoffs can result in a large number of stable partitions
since all moves to a new location which displace the rank of an existing agent are vetoed. Our
stability notion allows existence, but refines the number of stable partitions.
6

Consider an example with four agents with respective quality levels {4,2,1,0} and two
locations A and B. Under both average quality and big fish preferences the integrated stable
partition where agents 1 and 3 are located at A and 2 and 4 are at B is Pareto efficient.
7

Exceptions are Pápai [2004] which focuses on restrictions of permissible coalitions
which result in unique stable partitions and Ballester (2004) which focuses on complexity issues.
3

There are four main differences between the current paper and this literature. First, this literature
assumes the number of coalitions formed is endogenous, while in our model the number of groups
formed is fixed. Second, most of this literature considers preference domains which do not include
average quality or big fish preferences (examples include symmetric and separable preferences,
single-peaked preferences with ordered characteristics, preferences depending only on the best or
worst person in the group, etc.). Exceptions include the top-coalition preferences of Banerjee,
Konishi, and Sönmez [2001] (both average quality and big fish preferences are subsets of this
domain) and the aversion to enemies preferences of Dimitrov et. al. [2004] (big fish preferences are
a subset of this domain).8 The third difference between the current paper and this literature is the
stability concept; these papers use core stability, individual stability, Nash stability, and contractual
individual stability. Lastly our focus is different in that we are interested in the composition of stable
partitions and in what happens to segregated partitions when a new empty location is added.
The local public goods literature is also related to group formation since in these models
agents join jurisdictions (or groups) which produce local public goods. Here agents prefer to join
jurisdictions where other people have preferences for levels of local public good production (given
a specific tax structure) which are similar to their own preferences. See Wooders [1980], Bewley
[1981], Guesnerie and Oddou [1981], Greenberg and Weber [1986] and [1993], Jehiel and
Scotchmer [1997], Konishi, Le Breton and Weber [1998], and Gravel and Thoron [2004].

2. Model
8

Note that both of these papers use core stability, which is quite different from the
stability concept used here. Dimitrov and Sung [2004] examine individually stable partitions
with aversion to enemies preferences and Nash stable partitions with aversion to enemies
preferences when mutuality is imposed; big fish preferences do not satisfy mutuality.
4

Denote the set of agents by N={1, 2,...,i,...,n}. Each agent i is endowed with quality level qi.
An agent’s quality level may represent many different things such as an agent’s athletic ability,
academic ability, or publishing ability. Without loss of generality we assume that agents are indexed
such that q1$q2$...$qn. Let Q'={q1,q2,...,qn} and QfQ' represent the largest set of distinct quality
levels so that qi, qj0Q and i j imply qi qj.
There are m locations which are represented by the set L={A,B,...,G,...,M}. Each agent is
positioned at exactly one location. If {i,...,j} are the only agents located at G, we write {i,...,j}=G.
An agent’s location may represent many different things such as his athletic team or academic
department. Thus, an agent’s location represents a group that he joins. A partition F:N6L is an
assignment of each agent to exactly one location.
Consider the following general payoff function. If {i...,j,...,k}=C, then j receives a payoff of
uj(i,...,j,...,k) or uj(C). For any R such that F(R) C, R ’s payoff if he moves to C is uR (C+R).
We focus our analysis on the following two specifications of uj. Let :(X) represent the
cardinality of integer set X and if {i,...,k}=G, then let :(G)=:({i,...,k}).
Definition 1. Let {i,...,j,...,k}=G. If uj(G) is a strictly increasing function of aq(G) / (qi+...+qk)/:(G),
then agent j’s preferences can be represented by the average quality payoff function
Definition 2. Under the big fish payoff function, each agent prefers to be the highest quality agent
(or the “big fish”) in the group. Let j0G. Here uj(G) is strictly decreasing in :({R0G*qR $qj and R j).
We refer to rj(G)/ (1+ :({R0G*qR $qj and R j) as j’s quality ranking (or rank) at G. Thus, rj(G)=1
if :({R0G*qR $qj and R j)=0 and by definition this is j’s most preferred rank. In addition, if
rj(C+j)=rj(D+j) and :(C) :(D), then j strictly prefers to be a member of the larger group.
Definition 3. A given partition is stable if and only if for all i0D G, ui(D) < ui(G+i) implies that
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uj(G) $ uj(G+i) for the non-strict majority of agents j0G.9
Definition 4. A partition F: N6L is called segregated if:
(i) for all i,j,k 0N such that F(i)=F(j) and qk0(qi,qj) we have F(k)=F(i).
(ii) there does not exist i,j,k,R 0N with qi,qj $qN and qk,qR #qO<qN such that F(i)=F(k) F(j) =F(R).
Definition 5. A partition is called an integrated partition if it is not segregated.
Thus, at an integrated stable partition agents of similar quality are not always located together.
Definition 6. This definition is only needed for the case where q1>q2>...>qn and so for ease of
exposition we restrict the definition to this case. A group (or location) G is called an integrated
group if there exists agents i, j, and k such that qi>qj>qk, i0 G, k0 G, but j0D G. A group that is
not integrated is called a segregated group. Thus, segregated partitions consist entirely of segregated
groups. However, integrated partitions may consist of both integrated and segregated groups.

3. Average Quality Payoff Results
In this section, we examine the type of stable partitions that exist when all players want to
be in the group with the highest average quality. We also define a dynamic process and use this
process to look at what happens when a new empty location is added to a segregated stable partition.

Theorem 1: A partition is stable iff for all i0D G, qi >aq(G) implies aq(D)-aq(G)$(qi -aq(D))/:(G).
Proof: First we show that stability implies the stated condition. Assume there exists i0D G such
9

We assume that if i is indifferent about changing locations, then he chooses to stay where
he is. Additionally, approval for a move is granted only if agents are made strictly better off by
having the new agent join, while in Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] approval is granted as long
as agents are not made worse off by the addition of the new agent. However, if each agent has a
different quality level, then the addition of a new agent almost always changes average quality
and the two notions of approval coincide for average quality payoffs.
6

that qi>aq(G). Thus, the agents at G always allow i to move from D to G. Stability requires that i
does not want to move or that aq(D)$aq(G+i); this implies that aq(D)$ (:(G)+1)aq(G +i)/(:(G) +1)
= (:(G)aq(G)+qi ) /(:(G)+1). Rearranging yields aq(D)-aq(G) $(qi - aq(D))/:(G). Next, assume
that the condition of Theorem 1 is met, but that the partition is not stable. Thus, there exists i0D
who wants to and can move from D to G. Thus, aq(D)<aq(G+i); this is equivalent to aq(D)-aq(G)
<(qi - aq(D))/:(G). Such an i can move from D to G only if qi>aq(G). However, by assumption this
inequality implies that aq(D)-aq(G) $(qi - aq(D))/:(G); this is a contradiction. 
Notice that here if the addition of a new agent raises the average quality of the group, then
everyone in the group approves the new person joining. Thus, majority approval for a move and
unanimous approval (or even the stricter stability notion of requiring the approval of just one current
group member) always coincide.

Proposition 1: There exists a segregated stable partition which is strongly Pareto efficient.
Proof: First we show that the following segregated partition, call it Fs, is stable. Let Fs(1)=A and
Fs(i)=A for all i such that qi=q1. Let Fs(j)=B for all j with the second highest quality level. Continue
in this fashion until there are either no more agents or no more locations. If :(Q)>:(L), then place
all remaining agents at M. If :(Q)<:(L), then M is empty. For all i0D G with qi>aq(G) we know
that D<G#M or that qi=aq(D)>aq(G). Thus, aq(D)-aq(G) $(qi - aq(D))/:(G) = 0, and the
conditions of Theorem 1 are met. Thus, Fs is stable.
Next, we show that Fs is strongly Pareto efficient. The agents at A already have the highest
possible utility level, so any Pareto improvement should leave them at this level. The only way to
not decrease aq(A) is to have A stay together without anyone else. So, in any Pareto improvement
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these agents occupy their own location(s) and we are left with at most (m-1) locations for other
agents. Given this, the agents located at B should also be alone and we are left with at most (m-2)
locations for other agents. Continue in this fashion. All agents located at G M remain by
themselves; otherwise, at least one of them is made worse off. Thus, if :(Q)$:(L), then M is
nonempty and Fs is strongly Pareto efficient. If :(Q)<:(L), then :(M)=0. If there exists agents i0G
and j0G such that qi=qj, then we can move j to M. The payoffs at this new partition are exactly the
same as the payoffs at Fs. Thus, such a move is not Pareto improving. 
Example: Not all segregated partitions are stable.
Let m=2, n=4, q1 =20, q2 =10, q3 =9, q4 =8. The segregated partition {1,2,3}=A and {4}=B is not
stable since aq(A)=13, but aq(B+1)=14. Thus, 1 prefers to move from A to B.

Proposition 2: Assume q1>q2>...>qn. If qi > max {(q1+qi+1)/2, (q1+q2+qi+1)/3,..., (q1+q2+...+
qi-1+qi+1)/i} for all i0{2,...,n-1}, then there does not exist an integrated stable partition.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Assume agents are in an integrated stable partition and that
for all i0{2,...,n-1}, qi > max {(q1+qi+1)/2, (q1+q2+qi+1)/3,..., (q1+q2+...+qi-1 +qi+1)/i}. Since the
partition is integrated, there exists at least two non-empty groups one of which, say C, is integrated.
Let {i,...,k}=C with qi>...>qk, but let there exist j0D C such that qi>qj>qk.
Case 1: aq(D)#aq(C). Since C is integrated, aq(C) # max{(q1+qj+1)/2, (q1+q2+qj+1)/3,...,
(q1+q2+...+qj-1+qj+1)/j}. Since qj >max{(q1+qj+1)/2, (q1+q2+qj+1)/3,..., (q1+q2+...+qj-1 +qj+1)/j}, we
know that qj > aq(C). Thus, aq(C+j)>aq(C)$aq(D). So, j prefers to join C and the agents at C allow
j to join. Thus, the partition is not stable.
Case 2: aq(D)>aq(C). Either D is integrated or it is not. Assume D is integrated. Since
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qi>qj, but i0 C and j0D, then aq(D) # max{(q1+qi+1)/2, (q1+q2+qi+1)/3,..., (q1+q2+...+qi-1+qi+1)/i}.
By assumption, max{(q1+qi+1)/2,(q1+q2+qi+1)/3,...,(q1+q2+...+qi-1+qi+1)/i}< qi. Thus, aq(D+i)>aq(D)
>aq(C). So, i wants to move from C to D and the agents at D agree to this. If D is not integrated,
then qi is strictly larger than the quality of every agent located at D. Thus, aq(D+i)>aq(D)>aq(C),
and so i wants to join D and the agents at D let i join. Thus, the partition is not stable. 
Notice that the conditions of Proposition 2 are close to those necessary for i (respectively k)
to join G (resp. H). For instance, if G={1,2,...,i-1,i+1}, then qi>(q1+q2+...+qi-1+qi+1)/i is a necessary
condition for i to join G. However, if G={2,3,...,i-1,i+1}, then qi>(q2+q3+...+qi-1+qi+1)/(i-1) is a
necessary condition for i to join G; this condition is a weaker one than our qi>(q1+q2+...+qi-1+qi+1)/i.
Since we want i (resp. k) to join any such G (resp. H), it is unlikely that the conditions of Proposition
2 can be substantially weakened.

Proposition 3: Assume m=2 and that q1>q2>...>qn. If there exists i0 {2,...,n-1} such that
(q1+q2+...+qi-1+qi+1)/i > max {qi, (q1+qi+qi+2+qi+3+...+qn)/(n-i+1)}, then there exists an integrated
stable partition.
Proof: We show that the integrated partition where {1,2,...,i-2,i-1,i+1}=A and {i,i+2,i+3,...,n}=B
meets the conditions of Theorem 1 and so this partition is stable. By assumption, aq(A) =
(q1+q2+...+qi-1+qi+1)/i > qi. Thus, if there exists k0D G such that qk>aq(G), then k0A. If qk>aq(B),
then Theorem 1 requires that aq(A)-aq(B) $(qk - aq(A))/:(B).
aq(A)$aq(B+k), which by assumption is always true. 

Dynamics

9

This inequality is equivalent to

The following dynamic process is used in Propositions 4 and 7. Agents begin in a partition
which may or may not be stable. There is a set of periods {1,2,...,t,...} and at every t a pair pt=(i,G)
is randomly identified with uniform probability; i is allowed to move to G if such a move strictly
increases i’s payoff and if i has strict majority approval for the move by the agents at G. If, after
some t, no agents can move, then the dynamic process has reached a stable partition. A sequence
of such partitions generated by the dynamic process is called an improving path.10
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 4. This lemma shows that the
dynamic process never becomes stuck in a cycle of partitions.
Lemma 1: Assume agents are in an unstable partition. The dynamic process leads to a stable
partition with probability 1.
Proof: First note that since pt=(i,G) is randomly identified with uniform probability, the probability
that the same (i,G) is chosen every period approaches 0 as t64. Thus, with probability 1 the dynamic
process cannot become stuck in an unstable partition and leads to either a cycle of partitions or to
a stable partition. We show next, that the process always leads to a stable partition and not a cycle.
Define aqmax ={aq(A),...,aq(M)}. Let G be such that aq(G)=aqmax at time t. At time t+1,
either G remains the same or some i joins G or some j leaves G. If i joins G, then aq(G+i)>aq(G)
(otherwise the agents at G refuse to let i join). If j leaves G, then j leaves for H with aq(H+j)>aq(G).
Thus, H becomes the new highest average quality location. Therefore, in each period either the
group with aqmax remains the same, or the group changes and aqmax strictly increases. Since N, Q,
L are all finite sets, it is not possible for the average quality of the highest average quality group to
keep increasing. Thus, after some time period the group with aqmax remains unchanged. Starting at
10

The notion of an improving path was originated by Jackson and Watts [2002] in the
context of a dynamic model of network formation.
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this time, consider the group with the second highest average quality. Similar analysis shows that
this group also remains unchanged after some time period. Repeating this analysis shows that
eventually a stable partition is reached. 
Next, a new location is added to a segregated stable partition and agents are given the
opportunity to relocate. Proposition 4 provides conditions under which the dynamic process leads
to an integrated stable partition. We focus on this case because it is the most interesting, since the
results are somewhat surprising. Notice that if agents are instead originally in an integrated stable
partition and if enough new empty locations are added, then all improving paths lead to segregated
stable partitions. (Here any agent with quality level greater than the average quality at his current
location prefers to move to an empty location.) Thus, one might expect that adding new empty
locations leads to segregation. However, Proposition 4 shows this is not necessarily the case.

Proposition 4: Let q1>q2>...>qn. Assume that agents are in a segregated stable partition where
aq(A)>aq(B)>...>aq(M), :(A)#:(B)#...#:(M) and where there exists agent k0A and R0 D A such
that qR > aq(D) and (qk+qR)/2>aq(A). If a new location, Z, is added, then there exists an improving
path leading the dynamic process to an integrated stable partition.11
Proof: Step 1: Show k and R join Z, but that there exists i0{k+1,..., R-1} who does not. By Lemma
1, we know that with probability 1, the dynamic process ends in a stable partition. Since qR > aq(D),
if R is given the option to move to Z, he does. Since (qk+qR )/2 > aq(A), k also wants to move to Z.
Since qk > qR , R allows k to move to Z. Next, we check that k and R do not allow all agents {k+1,...,R1} to join Z and so Z is integrated. (By assumption qk > qR , which implies qk>(qk+qR )/2>aq(A) and
11

In fact we show that if agents R and k are given the first opportunity to move to Z, then
all improving paths lead to integrated stable partitions.
11

thus that R$k+2.)

Note that k and R only allow i to join Z if qi>(qk+qR )/2>aq(A). Since

q1>q2>...>qn and qk>aq(A), there exists j0A with qj<aq(A)<(qk+qR )/2; such a j is not allowed to join
Z. Since j0A and qj<aq(A)<(qk+qR )/2<qk, then j0{k+1,...,R-1}. Thus, Z is integrated. (Note also that
any jóA and j R has qj<aq(A)<(qk+qR )/2 and is not allowed to join Z.) So, far at least one agent has
left A and R has left D; we represent the agents currently at A and D by AN and DN and the original
agents by A and D.
Step 2: Show that the only agents ióZ who change locations are those who move to Z. By
the stability of the initial partition, no agent i moves from C to G, for any C,Gó{AN,DN, Z}. Next, we
show i does not move from AN to Gó{DN,Z}. Since :(A)#:(G) and ANdA, :(AN)<:(G). Combining
:(AN )<:(G) with the fact that all agents at G have lower quality than those at AN yields
aq(AN)$aq(G+i). We also show that no i moves from GN0{AN,B,...,C} to DN=D-R . We know ANdA
and for G0{A,...,C}, :(G)#:(D). Thus, :(GN)#:(D). Since all agents at D have lower quality than
those at GN, aq(GN)$aq(D-R+i). Similar reasoning shows no i leaves DN for a lower ranked group.
Note that i0DN cannot join a higher ranked group since such a group does not allow i to join. Thus,
all Gó{AN,DN,Z} have the same agents located at them as under the initial segregated partition.
Step 3: Show that no agent leaves Z. Thus, Z remains integrated. First we show that k does
not leave Z. By the stability of the initial partition, aq(G+k)#aq(A)<(qk+qR )/2 #aq(Z) for
Gó{AN,DN}.

Thus, k does not leave Z for G. By reasoning similar to that used in step 2, aq(D-

R+k)#aq(A)<(qk+qR )/2 #aq(Z). Thus, k does not leave Z for DN =D-R. Since the only agents who
left A are those with qi>(qk+qR)/2>aq(A), aq(AN+k)#aq(A)<(qk+qR )/2#aq(Z). Thus, k does not leave
Z for AN. Next, we show R does not leave Z. Agent R may want to leave Z for a group G0{AN,B,...,C}
with aq(G)>qR, but this group does not let R join. Since R is the only agent, who left D,
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aq(DN+R)=aq(D)< (qk+qR )/2#aq(Z). Thus, agent R does not leave Z for DN . By the stability of the
initial partition, aq(G+R)#aq(D)<(qk+qR)/2#aq(Z).

Thus,

R does not leave Z for G with

aq(G)<aq(D). From Step 1, any other i0Z was originally located at A and has qi>(qk+qR )/2>aq(A).
Similar reasoning to that for k above shows i does not leave Z. 

4. Big Fish Payoff Results
In this section, we examine the type of stable partitions that exist when each player wants to
be the highest quality agent in the group.

Theorem 2: A partition is stable if and only if for all i0D G, (i) :({j0D*qj$qi and j i})
>:({j0G*qj$qi }) implies :(G)$2 :({j0G*qj>qi }) and (ii) :({j0D*qj$qi and j i}) =:({j0G*qj$qi })
and :(D)<:(G)+1 imply :(G)$2 :({j0G*qj>qi }).
Proof: First we show that stability implies the condition stated in the proposition. Assume there
exists i0D G such that :({j0D*qj$qi and j i}) >:({j0G*qj$qi }) or :({j0D*qj$qi and j i})
=:({j0G*qj$qi }) and :(D)<:(G)+1. Thus, ri(D)>ri(G+i) or ri(D)=ri(G+i) and :(D)<:(G+i). So
i wants to move to G. Stability requires that the majority of agents at G do not allow i to move or
that

:({j0G*qj>qi})#:({j0G*qj#qi})=:(G)-:({j0G*qj>qi}),

rearranging

yields

:(G)$2

:({j0G*qj>qi}).
Next, assume that for all i0D G, :({j0D*qj$qi and j i}) >:({j0G*qj$qi}) or :({j0D*qj$qi
and j i}) =:({j0G*qj$qi}) and :(D)<:(G)+1 implies :(G)$2 :({j0G*qj>qi}), but that the partition
is not stable. Thus, there exists some i0D G who wants to and can join G. If i can join G, then
:(G)<2:({j0G*qj>qi}). If i wants to join G, then either :({j0D*qj$qi and j i}) >:({j0G*qj$qi}) or
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:({j0D*qj$qi and j i})=:({j0G*qj$qi}) and :(D)<:(G)+1.

However, by assumption these

inequalities imply that :(G)$2 :({j0G*qj>qi}); this is a contradiction. 

Proposition 5: There exists at least one stable segregated partition.
Proof: Case 1: n$m. Let ln/mm be the greatest integer not exceeding n/m. Let the remainder, r /
n - m@ln/mm. Consider the following segregated partition, FF. Place agents {q1, q2,...,qln/mm+r} at A.
Place {qln/mm+r+1, qln/mm+r+2,...., q2ln/mm+r} at B. Continue placing the next ln/mm agents at the next location
until the last ln/mm agents are placed at M. Thus, :(A)= ln/mm +r$ :(B)=...= :(M)=ln/mm. If there
exists i0D G such that :({j0D*qj$qi and j i})$:({j0G*qj$qi}), then by the construction of FF,
D<G. Thus, if i joins G, he is the highest ranked person (or is tied for the top rank). So,
2:({j0G*qj>qi})=0 # :(G) and the stability conditions of Theorem 2 are met.
Case 2: n<m. Place each agent at a different location. An argument similar to that above
shows that such a segregated partition is stable. 
Notice that at this segregated stable partition, high quality agents may want to move to a
lower quality group to improve their rank. However, all agents at the lower quality group veto the
move. Thus, such a segregated partition is also stable even under the stricter stability notion where
only one group member’s permission is needed in order to join the new group.
Example: Not all segregated partitions are stable. Let m=2, n=4, and q1>q2>q3>q4. The segregated
partition {1}=A and {2,3,4}=B is not stable since 4 moves to A.
Note: An implicit assumption of the big fish payoff function is that a person is indifferent
between being in a group with an agent of the same quality and being with an agent with strictly
higher quality. We could have assumed instead that a person is indifferent between being in a group
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with an agent of the same quality or being with an agent with strictly lower quality. We chose the
former assumption to capture the notion that big fish agents do not wish to share the limelight.
However, even if we instead chose the later assumption, Proposition 5 still holds true.12 In order to
simplify the proofs (and since we do not wish to focus on these issues) we assume in the remaining
propositions that q1>q2>...>qn.13
Lemma 2: Let q1>...>qn. There exists a segregated stable partition which is strongly Pareto efficient.
Proof: Case 1: n$m. Assume agents are in the segregated stable partition, FF, of Proposition 5.
Any agent currently ranked 1st is ranked 1st in any Pareto improvement otherwise that agent is made
worse off. Thus, the same m agents are ranked 1st in our m locations, and all 1st ranked positions are
occupied. Now consider agents who are currently ranked 2nd. They also are ranked 2nd in any Pareto
improvement and all 2nd ranked positions are occupied. Continue in this fashion. All ln/mm th ranked
agents are ranked ln/mm th at any Pareto improvement and all ln/mm th positions are occupied. If r=0,
then the current partition is strongly Pareto efficient. If r>0, consider the agent ranked (ln/mm +1)th;
this agent is ranked (ln/mm +1)th in any Pareto improvement. Since FF is segregated, this agent
continues to be located with the agents he is originally located with at A as locating this agent in any

12

One example of a segregated stable partition here involves placing agents with identical
quality levels at the same location, for instance by placing all agents with the lowest quality level
at one location, those with the second lowest at another location, and continuing in this fashion
until just one location is left and placing all remaining agents there. Using logic similar to that in
the proof of Proposition 5 one can show that this segregated partition is stable.
13

Note that Lemma 2 still holds true even if q1$q2$...$qn. By assumption if qi=qj and if i
and j are located in the same group, then both agents receive the same rank that j receives in the
case of qi>qj. Thus, in the segregated stable partition of Proposition 5, if some agents have
identical quality levels, then these agents may receive lower rankings than in the case where
q1>q2>...>qn. However, it is still true that raising one agent’s quality level by moving him to a
lower quality group decreases the rankings of the original agents in this lower group. Similarly,
by construction of the original partition any other repartitioning of agents that increases one
agent’s rank decreases another’s rank and is therefore not Pareto improving.
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other group gives him a rank of 1 instead of (ln/mm +1). Continue in this fashion. Thus, the (ln/mm
+r)th agent remains at A as well in any Pareto improvement and the original partition is strongly
Pareto efficient.
Case 2: n<m. Assume each agent is placed at a different location. Thus, each agent is
currently ranked first at his location. In order to increase any agent’s payoff he should be ranked first
in a larger group. However, the other members of such a larger group are made worse off, since they
are no longer ranked first. 
Proposition 6 shows that an integrated stable partition always exists as long as n>m. (If n#m,
then each agent prefers to be at his own location. Thus, all stable partitions are trivially
segregated.)14

Proposition 6: Let q1>...>qn. If n>m$2, then there exists at least one stable integrated partition.
Proof: Let ln/mm be the greatest integer not exceeding n/m. Let the remainder r / n - m@ln/mm . Let
s = r+1 if r#1 and let s=r otherwise. Consider the following integrated partition, FI. Place agents
{q2, q3,...,qln/mm+s} at A. Place {q1, qln/mm+s+1, qln/mm+s+2,...., q2ln/mm+r} at B. (Note that since n>m$2, :(B)$2
and B is integrated.) Place {q2ln/mm+r+1, q2ln/mm+r+2,...., q3ln/mm+r} at C. Continue by placing the next ln/mm
agents at the next location until the last ln/mm agents are placed at M. Note that :(A)=(ln/mm+s1)$:(B)=(ln/mm+r-s+1)$:(C)=. ..= :(M)=ln/mm .
If there exists i0D G, with :({j0D*qj$qi and j i}) >:({j0G*qj$qi}) or :({j0D*qj$qi and
j i}) =:({j0G*qj$qi}) and :(D)<:(G)+1, then either i=1 or i 1 and D<G.
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If i=1, then

Note that in Propositions 6 and 7 we assume that q1>q2>...>qn. If q1$q2$...$qn, then
there may exist no integrated partition let alone an integrated stable partition. (For instance if
q1=q2=...=qn, then no integrated partition exists.)
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:({j0B*qj$qi and j i}) = 0 = :({j0G*qj$qi}) for all G B.

So since n>m$2, :(G)

$1>0=2:({j0G*qj>qi}). If i 1 and D<G, then since q1>...>qn, :(G)$1>0=2:({j0G*qj>qi}). By
Theorem 2, FI is stable. 
Proposition 6 shows that integration is fairly easy to achieve with the big fish payoff function.
Here each agent wants to be the highest quality agent in the group, but does not care about the quality
of the other agents in the group as long as their quality is below his. Thus, a high quality agent is
willing to be located with low quality agents whereas under the average quality payoff function high
quality agents prefer to be located with other high quality agents.
Proposition 7 shows that integration may occur when a new location is added to a segregated
stable partition. The dynamic process which was described prior to Proposition 4 is used in
Proposition 7 and the corresponding proof. As in the case of Proposition 4, the results of Proposition
7 are somewhat surprising since if enough new locations are added to an integrated stable partition,
the dynamic process always leads to a segregated stable partition. (Here any agent ranked last at his
current location prefers to move to an empty location.) Thus, one might think that adding new empty
locations causes segregation, but Proposition 7 shows that this is not always true.

Proposition 7: Let q1>q2>...>qn. Assume agents are in a segregated stable partition where 10A and
where there exists D A such that :(D)$3. If a new location, Z, is added, then there exists an
improving path leading the dynamic process to either an integrated stable partition or to a series of
partitions where at least one location remains integrated at all times.15
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Specifically we show that if the lowest ranked agents at A and D are given the first
chance to move to the new location, then all improving paths lead to either an integrated stable
partition or to a series of partitions where at least one location remains integrated at all times.
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Proof: Step 1: Convergence (or not) of the dynamic process. Since pairs of agents and locations are
randomly identified every period in the dynamic process, with probability 1 the dynamic process
cannot become stuck in an unstable partition. Thus, the dynamic process leads to either a stable
partition or a series of partitions in which one agent changes locations at each step in the series. We
show that in either case at least one location remains integrated at all times.
Step 2: Let {1,2,...,i}=A and {j,j+1,...,k}=D A with k-j$2. Note that segregation requires that
qi>qj. If i=1, then k wants to move to A and 1 agrees to it. Thus, stability requires that i>1. Notice
also that stability requires that no location is empty in FS (otherwise k is better off moving to this
location which violates stability).
Step 3: Add Z. If i and then k are given the chance to move to Z, both do so.
Step 4: Check that no j0{i+1, i+2,...,k-1} joins Z. Currently {i,k}=Z. Agent k never allows
j such that qj>qk to move to Z; since strict majority approval is needed, the move does not occur.
Therefore if R joins Z, qR <qk; such a R also votes against j0{i+1,...,k-1} joining Z.
Step 5: Check that i and k do not leave Z. Since ri(Z)=1, i only wants to leave Z for G where
ri(G+i)=1 and :(G+i)>:(Z). However, all the agents at G veto the move. Next, we check that k
does not leave Z. Since rk(Z)=2, k only wants to leave Z for G where rk(G+k)=1 or for H where
rk(H+k)=2 and :(H+k)>:(Z). However, k cannot move to G, since all agents at G veto the move.
To move to H is also not possible since all agents ranked below him at H veto the move. 

5. Concluding Remarks
So far the average quality and big fish payoffs have been treated separately. However, it is
also interesting to compare the two cases. We give a flavor of such a comparison here, but leave a
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formal analysis of this issue as an open topic for future research. For instance, if some agents have
big fish payoffs while others have average quality payoffs, then it is possible that no segregated
stable partition exists, while we know from Propositions 1 and 5 that if all agents have average
quality or all have big fish preferences, then a segregated stable partition always exists. To see this,
let m=2, n=4, q1>q2>q3>q4, and let agents 1 and 2 have big fish preferences while 3 and 4 have
average quality preferences. Consider the segregated partition where {1}=A and {2,3,4}=B; here 4
moves to A. Thus, this partition is unstable. Additionally, the partition where {1,2}=A and {3,4}=B
is unstable since 2 moves to B. Similarly, no other segregated partition is stable as 2 always leaves
for a group where he is ranked first. However, the integrated partition {1,3}=A and {2,4}=B is
stable.16 Thus, having a mixture of preference types may increase the likelihood of integration.
Finally another interesting open question is to examine what happens if agents care about
both average quality and quality rankings.17 Here again one may expect segregation to be less likely
as low ranked agents may prefer to offset their low rank by being in a high quality group and high
quality agents with low ranks may want to improve their rank by moving to a low quality group.
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Notice here that to achieve stability we placed the top half of the average quality agents
with the top half of the big fish agents at A and the bottom half of both types at B; such a
partition is a natural extension of the partitions used to prove existence in Propositions 3 and 5.
Such a partition often results in stability, but not always since it is possible that a big fish agent
located at A wants to move to B and such a move is allowed if there are more average quality
than big fish agents at B and if aq(B) increases. Thus, stability with mixed preferences is
difficult to obtain and we leave it as an open question as to whether or not a stable partition
always exists.
17

Note that Damiano, Li and Suen [2004] examine location choice in a model with two
locations each of fixed size where agents care about both average quality and quality rankings.
Our model differs in that it allows for any number of locations and allows the number of agents
at a certain location to be endogenous.
19

References

Ballester, C. (2004). “NP-completeness in Hedonic Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 49,
1-30.
Banerjee, S., Konishi, H., and Sönmez, T. (2001). “Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game,”
Social Choice and Welfare 18, 135-153.
Bewley, T. (1981). “A Critique of Tiebout’s Theory of Local Public Expenditures,” Econometrica
49, 713-740.
Bogomolnaia, A., and Jackson, M.O. (2002). “The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures,”
Games and Economic Behavior 38, 201-230.
Burani, N., and Zwicker, W. (2003). “Coalition Formation Games with Separable Preferences,”
Mathematical Social Sciences 45, 27-52.
Brams, S., Jones, M., and Kilgour, D.M. (2002). “Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions,”
Journal of Theoretical Politics 14, 359-383.
Cechlárová, K., and Romero-Medina, A. (2001). “Stability in Coalition Formation Games,”
International Journal of Game Theory 29, 487-494.
Damiano, E., Li, H. and Suen, W. (2004). “First in Village or Second in Rome?” Mimeo:
University of Toronto.
Diamontoudi, E., and Xue, L. (2003). “Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games,” Social Choice and
Welfare 21, 39-61.
Dimitrov, D., Borm, P., Hendrickx, R., and Sung, S. (2004). “Simple Priorities and Core Stability
in Hedonic Games,” forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare.
Dimitrov, D., and Sung, S. (2004). “Enemies and Friends in Hedonic Games: Individual Deviations,
Stability and Manipulation,” Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, Discussion
Paper: 111.
Drèze, J., and Greenberg, J. (1980). “Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability,” Econometrica
48, 987-1003.
Frank, R. (1985). Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status. New York:
Oxford University Press.

20

Gravel, N. And Thoron, S. (2004). “Does Endogenous Formation of Jurisdictions Lead to Wealth
Stratification?” Mimeo: GREQAM.
Greenberg, J. (1978). “Pure and Local Public Goods: A Game-Theoretic Approach,” in Essays in
Public Economics (A. Sandmo, Ed.) Lexington, MA: Heath.
Greenberg, J., and Weber, S. (1986). “Strong Tiebout Equilibrium under Restricted Preference
Domain,” Journal of Economic Theory 38, 101-117.
Greenberg, J., and Weber, S. (1993). “Stable Coalition Structures with Unidimensional set of
Alternatives,” Journal of Economic Theory 60, 62-82.
Guesnerie, R., and Oddou, C. (1981). “Second Best Taxation as a Game,” Journal of Economic
Theory 25, 67-91.
Jackson, M.O., and Watts, A. (2002). “The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks,” Journal
of Economic Theory 106, 265-295.
Jehiel, P., and Scotchmer, S. (1997). “Free Mobility and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions,”
Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 0, 219-231.
Konishi, H., Le Breton, M., and Weber, S. (1998). “Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods
Economy,” Journal of Economic Theory 79, 224-244.
Milchtaich, I., and Winter, E. (2002). “Stability and Segregation in Group Formation,” Games and
Economic Behavior 38, 318-346.
Ök, E., and Kockesen, L. (2000). “Negatively Interdependent Preferences,” Social Choice and
Welfare 17, 533-558.
Pápai, S. (2004). “Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games,” Games and Economic
Behavior 48, 337-354.
Tiebout, C. (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy 64, 416424.
Wooders, M. (1980). “The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies,”
Econometrica 48, 1467-1485.

21

NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series
Our Note di Lavoro are available on the Internet at the following addresses:
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.html
http://www.ssrn.com/link/feem.html
http://www.repec.org
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu

NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2006
SIEV

1.2006

CCMP

2.2006

CCMP
KTHC

3.2006
4.2006

SIEV

5.2006

CCMP

6.2006

PRCG
SIEV
CTN
CTN
NRM

7.2006
8.2006
9.2006
10.2006
11.2006

NRM

12.2006

CCMP
KTHC
KTHC
CSRM

13.2006
14.2006
15.2006
16.2006

CCMP

17.2006

IEM
CTN

18.2006
19.2006

CCMP

20.2006

SIEV

21.2006

CCMP

22.2006

NRM

23.2006

NRM

24.2006

SIEV

25.2006

SIEV

26.2006

KTHC

27.2006

CCMP

28.2006

IEM

29.2006

KTHC
ETA

30.2006
31.2006

IEM

32.2006

NRM

33.2006

CTN

34.2006

IEM
ETA

35.2006
36.2006

Anna ALBERINI: Determinants and Effects on Property Values of Participation in Voluntary Cleanup Programs:
The Case of Colorado
Valentina BOSETTI, Carlo CARRARO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Stabilisation Targets, Technical Change and the
Macroeconomic Costs of Climate Change Control
Roberto ROSON: Introducing Imperfect Competition in CGE Models: Technical Aspects and Implications
Sergio VERGALLI: The Role of Community in Migration Dynamics
Fabio GRAZI, Jeroen C.J.M. van den BERGH and Piet RIETVELD: Modeling Spatial Sustainability: Spatial
Welfare Economics versus Ecological Footprint
Olivier DESCHENES and Michael GREENSTONE: The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from
Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in Weather
Michele MORETTO and Paola VALBONESE: Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach
Anna ALBERINI and Aline CHIABAI: Discount Rates in Risk v. Money and Money v. Money Tradeoffs
Jon X. EGUIA: United We Vote
Shao CHIN SUNG and Dinko DIMITRO: A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games
Fabio CERINA (lxxviii): Tourism Specialization and Sustainability: A Long-Run Policy Analysis
Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxxviii): Benchmarking in Tourism
Destination, Keeping in Mind the Sustainable Paradigm
Jens HORBACH: Determinants of Environmental Innovation – New Evidence from German Panel Data Sources
Fabio SABATINI: Social Capital, Public Spending and the Quality of Economic Development: The Case of Italy
Fabio SABATINI: The Empirics of Social Capital and Economic Development: A Critical Perspective
Giuseppe DI VITA: Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence
Rob B. DELLINK and Marjan W. HOFKES: The Timing of National Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions in
the Presence of Other Environmental Policies
Philippe QUIRION: Distributional Impacts of Energy-Efficiency Certificates Vs. Taxes and Standards
Somdeb LAHIRI: A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems
Massimiliano MAZZANTI and Roberto ZOBOLI: Examining the Factors Influencing Environmental
Innovations
Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-ICHI AKAO: Non-pecuniary Work Incentive and Labor Supply
Marzio GALEOTTI, Matteo MANERA and Alessandro LANZA: On the Robustness of Robustness Checks of the
Environmental Kuznets Curve
Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-ICHI AKAO: When is it Optimal to Exhaust a Resource in a Finite Time?
Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-ICHI AKAO: Non-pecuniary Value of Employment and Natural Resource
Extinction
Lucia VERGANO and Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: Analysis and Evaluation of Ecosystem Resilience: An Economic
Perspective
Danny CAMPBELL, W. George HUTCHINSON and Riccardo SCARPA: Using Discrete Choice Experiments to
Derive Individual-Specific WTP Estimates for Landscape Improvements under Agri-Environmental Schemes
Evidence from the Rural Environment Protection Scheme in Ireland
Vincent M. OTTO, Timo KUOSMANEN and Ekko C. van IERLAND: Estimating Feedback Effect in Technical
Change: A Frontier Approach
Giovanni BELLA: Uniqueness and Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Model with Polluting Emissions
Alessandro COLOGNI and Matteo MANERA: The Asymmetric Effects of Oil Shocks on Output Growth: A
Markov-Switching Analysis for the G-7 Countries
Fabio SABATINI: Social Capital and Labour Productivity in Italy
Andrea GALLICE (lxxix): Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret
Andrea BIGANO and Paul SHEEHAN: Assessing the Risk of Oil Spills in the Mediterranean: the Case of the
Route from the Black Sea to Italy
Rinaldo BRAU and Davide CAO (lxxviii): Uncovering the Macrostructure of Tourists’ Preferences. A Choice
Experiment Analysis of Tourism Demand to Sardinia
Parkash CHANDER and Henry TULKENS: Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International
Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion
Valeria COSTANTINI and Salvatore MONNI: Environment, Human Development and Economic Growth
Ariel RUBINSTEIN (lxxix): Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times

ETA

37.2006

ETA

38.2006

ETA

39.2006

CCMP

40.2006

IEM

41.2006

CCMP

42.2006

KTHC

43.2006

CCMP

44.2006

SIEV

45.2006

NRM

46.2006

KTHC

47.2006

KTHC

48.2006

KTHC

49.2006

KTHC

50.2006

KTHC

51.2006

KTHC

52.2006

KTHC
KTHC

53.2006
54.2006

KTHC

55.2006

KTHC

56.2006

KTHC

57.2006

KTHC
KTHC

58.2006
59.2006

KTHC

60.2006

KTHC

61.2006

KTHC

62.2006

KTHC

63.2006

KTHC

64.2006

KTHC

65.2006

KTHC

66.2006

KTHC

67.2006

KTHC

68.2006

KTHC

69.2006

KTHC

70.2006

ETA

71.2006

CTN

72.2006

CTN

73.2006

CTN
CTN
CTN

74.2006
75.2006
76.2006

CTN

77.2006

CTN
CTN

78.2006
79.2006

Maria SALGADO (lxxix): Choosing to Have Less Choice
Justina A.V. FISCHER and Benno TORGLER: Does Envy Destroy Social Fundamentals? The Impact of Relative
Income Position on Social Capital
Benno TORGLER, Sascha L. SCHMIDT and Bruno S. FREY: Relative Income Position and Performance: An
Empirical Panel Analysis
Alberto GAGO, Xavier LABANDEIRA, Fidel PICOS And Miguel RODRÍGUEZ: Taxing Tourism In Spain:
Results and Recommendations
Karl van BIERVLIET, Dirk Le ROY and Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: An Accidental Oil Spill Along the Belgian
Coast: Results from a CV Study
Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL: Endogenous Technology and Tradable Emission Quotas
Giulio CAINELLI and Donato IACOBUCCI: The Role of Agglomeration and Technology in Shaping Firm
Strategy and Organization
Alvaro CALZADILLA, Francesco PAULI and Roberto ROSON: Climate Change and Extreme Events: An
Assessment of Economic Implications
M.E. KRAGT, P.C. ROEBELING and A. RUIJS: Effects of Great Barrier Reef Degradation on Recreational
Demand: A Contingent Behaviour Approach
C. GIUPPONI, R. CAMERA, A. FASSIO, A. LASUT, J. MYSIAK and A. SGOBBI: Network Analysis, Creative
System Modelling and DecisionSupport: The NetSyMoD Approach
Walter F. LALICH (lxxx): Measurement and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in
Sydney
Elena PASPALANOVA (lxxx): Cultural Diversity Determining the Memory of a Controversial Social Event
Ugo GASPARINO, Barbara DEL CORPO and Dino PINELLI (lxxx): Perceived Diversity of Complex
Environmental Systems: Multidimensional Measurement and Synthetic Indicators
Aleksandra HAUKE (lxxx): Impact of Cultural Differences on Knowledge Transfer in British, Hungarian and
Polish Enterprises
Katherine MARQUAND FORSYTH and Vanja M. K. STENIUS (lxxx): The Challenges of Data Comparison and
Varied European Concepts of Diversity
Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI (lxxx): Rethinking the Gains from Immigration: Theory and
Evidence from the U.S.
Monica BARNI (lxxx): From Statistical to Geolinguistic Data: Mapping and Measuring Linguistic Diversity
Lucia TAJOLI and Lucia DE BENEDICTIS (lxxx): Economic Integration and Similarity in Trade Structures
Suzanna CHAN (lxxx): “God’s Little Acre” and “Belfast Chinatown”: Diversity and Ethnic Place Identity in
Belfast
Diana PETKOVA (lxxx): Cultural Diversity in People’s Attitudes and Perceptions
John J. BETANCUR (lxxx): From Outsiders to On-Paper Equals to Cultural Curiosities? The Trajectory of
Diversity in the USA
Kiflemariam HAMDE (lxxx): Cultural Diversity A Glimpse Over the Current Debate in Sweden
Emilio GREGORI (lxxx): Indicators of Migrants’ Socio-Professional Integration
Christa-Maria LERM HAYES (lxxx): Unity in Diversity Through Art? Joseph Beuys’ Models of Cultural
Dialogue
Sara VERTOMMEN and Albert MARTENS (lxxx): Ethnic Minorities Rewarded: Ethnostratification on the Wage
Market in Belgium
Nicola GENOVESE and Maria Grazia LA SPADA (lxxx): Diversity and Pluralism: An Economist's View
Carla BAGNA (lxxx): Italian Schools and New Linguistic Minorities: Nationality Vs. Plurilingualism. Which
Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?
Vedran OMANOVIĆ (lxxx): Understanding “Diversity in Organizations” Paradigmatically and Methodologically
Mila PASPALANOVA (lxxx): Identifying and Assessing the Development of Populations of Undocumented
Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels
Roberto ALZETTA (lxxx): Diversities in Diversity: Exploring Moroccan Migrants’ Livelihood in Genoa
Monika SEDENKOVA and Jiri HORAK (lxxx): Multivariate and Multicriteria Evaluation of Labour Market
Situation
Dirk JACOBS and Andrea REA (lxxx): Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in
The Netherlands and Belgium
Eric M. USLANER (lxxx): Does Diversity Drive Down Trust?
Paula MOTA SANTOS and João BORGES DE SOUSA (lxxx): Visibility & Invisibility of Communities in Urban
Systems
Rinaldo BRAU and Matteo LIPPI BRUNI: Eliciting the Demand for Long Term Care Coverage: A Discrete
Choice Modelling Analysis
Dinko DIMITROV and Claus-JOCHEN HAAKE: Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core
Ottorino CHILLEM, Benedetto GUI and Lorenzo ROCCO: On The Economic Value of Repeated Interactions
Under Adverse Selection
Sylvain BEAL and Nicolas QUÉROU: Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation
Sophie BADE, Guillaume HAERINGER and Ludovic RENOU: Bilateral Commitment
Andranik TANGIAN: Evaluation of Parties and Coalitions After Parliamentary Elections
Rudolf BERGHAMMER, Agnieszka RUSINOWSKA and Harrie de SWART: Applications of Relations and
Graphs to Coalition Formation
Paolo PIN: Eight Degrees of Separation
Roland AMANN and Thomas GALL: How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups

CTN
CCMP

80.2006
81.2006

CSRM

82.2006

CTN

83.2006

PRCG

84.2006

CCMP

85.2006

CCMP

86.2006

KTHC

87.2006

CCMP

88.2006

CCMP

89.2006

SIEV

90.2006

PRCG
CCMP

91.2006
92.2006

CCMP

93.2006

CCMP

94.2006

CCMP

95.2006

CCMP

96.2006

KTHC

97.2006

CCMP

98.2006

PRCG

99.2006

NRM

100.2006

NRM

101.2006

CCMP

102.2006

KTHC

103.2006

SIEV

104.2006

NRM

105.2006

PRCG

106.2006

CCMP

107.2006

NRM

108.2006

PRCG
KTHC
KTHC

109.2006
110.2006
111.2006

IEM

112.2006

SIEV

113.2006

CCMP

114.2006

NRM

115.2006

CCMP

116.2006

CCMP

117.2006

Maria MONTERO: Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity
Vincent M. OTTO, Andreas LÖSCHEL and John REILLY: Directed Technical Change and Climate Policy
Nicoletta FERRO: Riding the Waves of Reforms in Corporate Law, an Overview of Recent Improvements in
Italian Corporate Codes of Conduct
Siddhartha BANDYOPADHYAY and Mandar OAK: Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary
Democracy
Raphaël SOUBEYRAN: Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate
Choose an Extremist Position?
Eduardo L. GIMÉNEZ and Miguel RODRÍGUEZ: Pigou’s Dividend versus Ramsey’s Dividend in the Double
Dividend Literature
Andrea BIGANO, Jacqueline M. HAMILTON and Richard S.J. TOL: The Impact of Climate Change on
Domestic and International Tourism: A Simulation Study
Fabio SABATINI: Educational Qualification, Work Status and Entrepreneurship in Italy an Exploratory Analysis
Richard S.J. TOL: The Polluter Pays Principle and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change: An Application of
Fund
Philippe TULKENS and Henry TULKENS: The White House and The Kyoto Protocol: Double Standards on
Uncertainties and Their Consequences
Andrea M. LEITER and Gerald J. PRUCKNER: Proportionality of Willingness to Pay to Small Risk Changes –
The Impact of Attitudinal Factors in Scope Tests
Raphäel SOUBEYRAN: When Inertia Generates Political Cycles
Alireza NAGHAVI: Can R&D-Inducing Green Tariffs Replace International Environmental Regulations?
Xavier PAUTREL: Reconsidering The Impact of Environment on Long-Run Growth When Pollution Influences
Health and Agents Have Finite-Lifetime
Corrado Di MARIA and Edwin van der WERF: Carbon Leakage Revisited: Unilateral Climate Policy with
Directed Technical Change
Paulo A.L.D. NUNES and Chiara M. TRAVISI: Comparing Tax and Tax Reallocations Payments in Financing
Rail Noise Abatement Programs: Results from a CE valuation study in Italy
Timo KUOSMANEN and Mika KORTELAINEN: Valuing Environmental Factors in Cost-Benefit Analysis Using
Data Envelopment Analysis
Dermot LEAHY and Alireza NAGHAVI: Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI vs.
Joint Ventures
Inmaculada MARTÍNEZ-ZARZOSO, Aurelia BENGOCHEA-MORANCHO and Rafael MORALES LAGE: The
Impact of Population on CO2 Emissions: Evidence from European Countries
Alberto CAVALIERE and Simona SCABROSETTI: Privatization and Efficiency: From Principals and Agents to
Political Economy
Khaled ABU-ZEID and Sameh AFIFI: Multi-Sectoral Uses of Water & Approaches to DSS in Water
Management in the NOSTRUM Partner Countries of the Mediterranean
Carlo GIUPPONI, Jaroslav MYSIAK and Jacopo CRIMI: Participatory Approach in Decision Making Processes
for Water Resources Management in the Mediterranean Basin
Kerstin RONNEBERGER, Maria BERRITTELLA, Francesco BOSELLO and Richard S.J. TOL: Klum@Gtap:
Introducing Biophysical Aspects of Land-Use Decisions Into a General Equilibrium Model A Coupling
Experiment
Avner BEN-NER, Brian P. McCALL, Massoud STEPHANE, and Hua WANG: Identity and Self-Other
Differentiation in Work and Giving Behaviors: Experimental Evidence
Aline CHIABAI and Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: Economic Valuation of Oceanographic Forecasting Services: A CostBenefit Exercise
Paola MINOIA and Anna BRUSAROSCO: Water Infrastructures Facing Sustainable Development Challenges:
Integrated Evaluation of Impacts of Dams on Regional Development in Morocco
Carmine GUERRIERO: Endogenous Price Mechanisms, Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and
Evidence
Richard S.J. TOL, Stephen W. PACALA and Robert SOCOLOW: Understanding Long-Term Energy Use and
Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the Usa
Carles MANERA and Jaume GARAU TABERNER: The Recent Evolution and Impact of Tourism in the
Mediterranean: The Case of Island Regions, 1990-2002
Carmine GUERRIERO: Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence
John FOOT (lxxx): Mapping Diversity in Milan. Historical Approaches to Urban Immigration
Donatella CALABI: Foreigners and the City: An Historiographical Exploration for the Early Modern Period
Andrea BIGANO, Francesco BOSELLO and Giuseppe MARANO: Energy Demand and Temperature: A
Dynamic Panel Analysis
Anna ALBERINI, Stefania TONIN, Margherita TURVANI and Aline CHIABAI: Paying for Permanence: Public
Preferences for Contaminated Site Cleanup
Vivekananda MUKHERJEE and Dirk T.G. RÜBBELKE: Global Climate Change, Technology Transfer and
Trade with Complete Specialization
Clive LIPCHIN: A Future for the Dead Sea Basin: Water Culture among Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians
Barbara BUCHNER, Carlo CARRARO and A. Denny ELLERMAN: The Allocation of European Union
Allowances: Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles
Richard S.J. TOL: Carbon Dioxide Emission Scenarios for the Usa

NRM

118.2006

SIEV

119.2006

SIEV

120.2006

CCMP

121.2006

ETA

122.2006

KTHC

123.2006

PRIV

124.2006

SIEV

125.2006

SIEV

126.2006

CTN

127.2006

Isabel CORTÉS-JIMÉNEZ and Manuela PULINA: A further step into the ELGH and TLGH for Spain and Italy
Beat HINTERMANN, Anna ALBERINI and Anil MARKANDYA: Estimating the Value of Safety with Labor
Market Data: Are the Results Trustworthy?
Elena STRUKOVA, Alexander GOLUB and Anil MARKANDYA: Air Pollution Costs in Ukraine
Massimiliano MAZZANTI, Antonio MUSOLESI and Roberto ZOBOLI: A Bayesian Approach to the Estimation
of Environmental Kuznets Curves for CO2 Emissions
Jean-Marie GRETHER, Nicole A. MATHYS, and Jaime DE MELO: Unraveling the World-Wide Pollution
Haven Effect
Sergio VERGALLI: Entry and Exit Strategies in Migration Dynamics
Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Valentina MILELLA: Privatization in Western Europe Stylized Facts, Outcomes
and Open Issues
Pietro CARATTI, Ludovico FERRAGUTO and Chiara RIBOLDI: Sustainable Development Data Availability on
the Internet
S. SILVESTRI, M PELLIZZATO and V. BOATTO: Fishing Across the Centuries: What Prospects for the Venice
Lagoon?
Alison WATTS: Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups

(lxxviii) This paper was presented at the Second International Conference on "Tourism and Sustainable
Economic Development - Macro and Micro Economic Issues" jointly organised by CRENoS (Università
di Cagliari and Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, and supported by the World Bank,
Chia, Italy, 16-17 September 2005.
(lxxix) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on "Economic Theory and Experimental
Economics" jointly organised by SET (Center for advanced Studies in Economic Theory, University of
Milano-Bicocca) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, Milan, 20-23 November 2005. The Workshop
was co-sponsored by CISEPS (Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics and Social Sciences,
University of Milan-Bicocca).
(lxxx) This paper was presented at the First EURODIV Conference “Understanding diversity: Mapping
and measuring”, held in Milan on 26-27 January 2006 and supported by the Marie Curie Series of
Conferences “Cultural Diversity in Europe: a Series of Conferences.

2006 SERIES
CCMP

Climate Change Modelling and Policy (Editor: Marzio Galeotti )

SIEV

Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini)

NRM

Natural Resources Management (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)

KTHC

Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano)

IEM

International Energy Markets (Editor: Matteo Manera)

CSRM

Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Giulio Sapelli)

PRCG

Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)

ETA

Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro)

CTN

Coalition Theory Network

